Reviewed: GEM Anscombe and PT Geach, Trois philosophes, Aristote, Thomas, Frege, translated from English by D. Berlioz and F. Loth, preface by F. Nef, Paris, Éditions Ithaque, 2014.
The Aristotelian-Thomist tradition
In the second half of the 20th century, two conceptions of metaphysics emerged. For one – we find it in Martin Heidegger, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Richard Rorty – metaphysics is a finished story. The other, on the other hand, pursues the traditional ambition of metaphysics: to say what reality is fundamentally. Its main actors are Bertrand Russell, Roderick Chisholm, David Armstrong, George Molnar, David K. Lewis, E. Jonathan Lowe – and also Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter Geach. Their joint book, Three Philosophers, appeared in 1961. It is fortunate that the Ithaque editions publish a neat and precise translation.
The originality and interest of this book is to expose a metaphysics in the tradition of Aristotle and Saint Thomas [1]. Anscombe and Geach are even at the origin of the " analytical thomism ". This name, of unverified origin, designates the philosophers integrating, while discussing it, the doctrine of Saint Thomas within the framework of analytical philosophy. Some readers will appreciate that our two authors are interested in Aristotle and Saint Thomas without scholarly archeology or footnotes. This is because the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition not only has a history, but it constitutes a very much alive contemporary philosophical current.
In the metaphysics that our two authors expose, what really exists, fundamentally making up the world, are substances: Socrates, such a dog, this cabbage, this table. What is said of a substance (" to be a man or that which is in a substance (the grammar which is, let us suppose, in the mind of a man) exists only as a function of a substance. Substances are thus the primary constituents of the world, and all other things, properties, relations, different ways of being in general, presuppose the existence of substance. The reality of substances is their ontological priority ; they are presupposed in all that we say about the things around us, at least if we accept a certain analysis of what we say about the things around us, that made by Aristotle in his treatise on the Categories.
The defense of a metaphysics of substance goes through a theory of denomination. What do we say when referring to something by a proper name, whether it is a human being, a dog or a cabbage (p. 5) ? The theory of naming itself requires a theory of preaching. It explains how we talk about things, insisting, following Aristotle and Saint Thomas, on the difference between the subject and the predicate (what is said about the subject). Anscombe and Geach borrow from the Stagirite and the Angelic Doctor linguistic and ontological descriptions as well as arguments forming the basic structures of an Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics. Anscombe wrote the part of the book devoted to Aristotle, and Geach the other two parts, on Thomas and on Frege. But the unity of this book suffers in no way: its metaphysical orientation remains constant, clear and firm from start to finish.
Aristotle
What exists for Aristotle are concrete things. Of them, as subject, one says something, that they are white for example ; and we also say what is there, the knowledge of grammar for example, when we speak of a man, but not of a dog. Anscombe trims neither the asperities nor the difficulties, inseparably technical and philosophical, of Aristotle's text. However, about the being of beings, nothing is mysterious: Aristotle explains what is and what can be intelligibly said about it. Understanding the Categories or Aristotle's Metaphysics presupposes patience and rigor in the analysis of the questions posed, in the style of Wittgenstein, who also (implicitly) inspires Anscombe's method of reading. " The inability to philosophize would render a researcher unfit to understand Aristotle's ideas “, says Anscombe, and “ help will not come here from just any kind of philosophy, but some current methods may prove useful (p. 59). The presentation also passes through the criticism of the Platonists, of John Locke, Bertrand Russell, Willard VO Quine, and even of Peter Pan (p. 24).
It emerges that metaphysics is a method of conceptual analysis which has ontological consequences. Of which " current methods » Does Anscombe speak ? Those of analytical philosophers, at least those who have not thought of the analysis of language as the means of dissolving philosophical questions, even if this analysis can, if need be, show that philosophical conceptions are erroneous. Anscombe and Geach make, like Aristotle, the analysis of language the means of attaining fundamental reality and its true articulations.
Thomas Aquinas
Peter Geach's presentation deals, in the first part, with the fundamental elements of Aquinate metaphysics: matter, form, esse (existence), operations and tendencies. Geach uses the instruments of logico-linguistic analysis which he considers essential for the best understanding of Saint Thomas, like Anscombe for that of Aristotle. The second part of Geach's account of Saint Thomas is devoted to the existence of God and his nature. About the material Saint Thomas is the disciple of Aristotle, says Geach ; on the other hand, " he had to work tirelessly to overcome the difficulties relating to the form, and there he had to explore a territory that Aristotle had only touched (p. 70).
The distinction between subject and attribute corresponds to the metaphysical difference between individual things (substances) and what we say about them (forms). We thus see how the analysis of language (between the subject and the attribute) covers the ontological analysis (concerning the things themselves). This kind of analysis allows Geach to insist on the philosophical error consisting in objectifying (reifying) the terms placed in predicate. The statement " Socrates is wise » encourages talking about « the wisdom of socrates as if it were also a reality in the world. We then blur the ontological difference between what really exists (substances) and what we say about them (their properties, relations, modalities), by making a description of something a subject of discourse.
Another concern of metaphysics is the meaning of the word " God ". Going through the analysis of language, it is a question of examining the question of divine attributes, that is to say what we say about God. This is why theologians, including Saint Thomas, were led to develop elaborate theories of the meaning of theological statements [2]. Suppose we are talking about the omnipotence of God or the love of God. The use made of these attributes or predicates (“ God is almighty », « God is love ") is it unambiguous ? We then use these attributes about God as we would about other, non-divine things. Or is this usage equivocal ? This time we systematically apply to God terms that do not allow us to say what he is. Perhaps it is wiser to speak of God only negatively (negative theology) or even to pretend to say nothing about him. Which could lead to a theory of divine ineffability. Another solution is to say that the terms used are analogical: their use of God signifying a perfection which is not attributed to other things to which we apply these same terms. This design includes, says Geach, " considerable difficulties (p. 117). A theory of meaning thus proves to be indispensable to a rational theology: the use of “do” when applied to God is closer to that found in “the minstrel makes music” than when we say “the smith makes a horseshoe” (p. 105). The blacksmith indeed works from pre-existing material, whereas the minstrel does not make music from sounds already there and the music stops when he stops making them. Which is enlightening, by analogy, for the idea of divine creation.
Geach shows how Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics is also a philosophical theology, that is to say how the theology inherited from Saint Thomas is articulated with a metaphysics attentive to the logical analysis of language, let's say a " analytical theology – an expression (now in use [3]) which however Geach does not use. If Thomas denies that we know what God is, " he does not say that God cannot be the object of true preaching (p. 112) Geach does not shy away from wording like: For some y, y is God, and for any z, if z is God, z is the same God as y ". The dogma of the Trinity (one God in three persons), constitutive of Christianity, is made explicit, as much as possible.
Frege
What does an appendix do then on Frege, German philosopher, mathematician and logician from the turn of the 19th to the 20th century, in a book of metaphysics and rational theology in the wake of Aristotle and Saint Thomas? ? Geach admires Frege's ability to solve by the invention of appropriate symbolism fundamental problems in mathematics, particularly those in which the theory of predication plays a decisive role. More precisely, it is the link between the theory of predication (what we can say about things and how we can say them) and the Fregean theory of functions (mathematics) that interests him. Geach is however (very) critical of Frege ; and some of the difficulties he points out lead back to St. Thomas. However, the Fregean theory of functions is not reserved for mathematics: it can even serve as an instrument in the study of Aristotle and that of Thomas. For example, Geach explains that " there may very well be functions, for example F( ) and G( ), such that we can demonstrate the mathematical theorem which says that for any x, x = F(x) = G(x), without being able quote a specific number that satisfies this equation ; we can even demonstrate that any number which satisfied this equation would be too large to be apprehended distinctly (p. 118).
For Geach, " this sounds like what thomas claims of god (p. 118). We know there is a being we call " God ", but we do not grasp the simple nature (reality) which validates the predicates " wise », « correct " and even " existing », simultaneously validating these predicates that we apply to it. Two important articles by Geach, “ History of the Corruptions of Logic » [4] and « Form and Existence [5], extend the analyzes contained in the book. They testify to what Geach thought he would find in Frege to deal with metaphysical and theological questions apparently far removed from the mathematical and philosophical questions that preoccupied the German philosopher.
Another Analytical Philosophy
It is not known who are the three philosophers of the famous painting by Giorgione, reproduced on the cover of the book. Anscombe and Geach make no secret of their three philosophers, but the images they offer of them are unpublished. These are three major figures in philosophy, Anscombe and Geach's book is therefore a major work for the history of philosophy. In this revival of metaphysics, characteristic of the second half of the 20th century, at least in analytical philosophy, Anscombe and Geach make a particular voice heard, that of the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition. One could believe that she had passed away. She is obviously more alive than ever. Philosophers clearly stepping forward in an answer to the question of what fundamentally exists had indeed become rare in modern philosophy. Following Hume and Kant, she cultivated what can be called antirealism », the thesis according to which we do not have access to reality such as it is in itself. We must limit our claims to knowledge of the representation (always for us and not in itself) of reality. Which can make us skeptical about the existence of a reality independent of our representations and metaphysical assertions about what actually exists.
The instrumentalist conceptions of science went in the same direction: the world of scientific theories would be a construction and not an independent reality. On the other hand, this book reconnects radically with metaphysics. It would then be a mistake to regard it only as a work on the history of philosophy: it intends to defend a realistic conception of metaphysics, as a true description of reality, by showing how one passes from logico-linguistic analyzes to affirmations ontological.
Anscombe's philosophy of intentional action is studied today in France. His book, L'Intention [6], even had the honor of the philosophy aggregation program. Let us express the wish that the philosophical current to which it seems judicious to link Anscombe and Geach, inspired by Aristotle and Saint Thomas, using methods borrowed from Frege and Wittgenstein [7], be better identified and recognized. The phrase " analytical philosophy evokes currently in France, it seems, two things. First, the rejection of metaphysical speculation in favor of an analysis of ordinary language which is relayed in certain forms of pragmatism (Hilary Putnam, Stanley Cavell). Second, the mutation of philosophy of mind into philosophy of cognitive science (Daniel Dennett, Jaegwon Kim), and also the evolutionary mutation of old philosophical and scientific disciplines into " neuro-something (neuro-ethics, neuro-aesthetics, neuro-economics, and even neuro-theology). Anscombe and Geach's book cannot be classified in either of these two tendencies. The reason is its rooting in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, with the realistic ambition of its metaphysics and its theology that this implies. With this book, the French reader thus has access to an approach less recognized in France of analytic philosophy, but also to an original interpretation of three great authors of the philosophical tradition.
